Dr Saba Kassa
Senior Specialist / Deputy Director, Prevention, Research and Innovation
Dr Saba Kassa is a public governance expert with over 10 years of experience in promoting democratic governance. She leads implementation of the research, technical assistance and capacity-building activities of the Basel Institute’s Prevention, Research and Innovation team.
Prior to joining the Institute, Saba worked for several international organisations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, including the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the German Ministry for International Cooperation and the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
Saba holds a PhD in International Development Studies from the International Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, a Master in International Development Studies from the University of Amsterdam, as well as a Master in Public Administration from Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Publications
The Evolution of Corruption and Crimes at Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint: The Impact of EU Accession
Published in the Journal of Illicit Trade, Financial Crime, and Compliance, this article examines how Bulgaria’s 2007 accession to the European Union transformed illegal activities and corruption at the Kapitan Andreevo border checkpoint.
While the introduction of stricter EU regulations and advanced surveillance technology aimed to secure the border, these measures had the effect of transforming criminal strategies and corruption. The authors detail a shift from blatant smuggling to more sophisticated financial frauds, VAT carousel schemes and the illicit privatisation of public border functions.
The article highlights that in some cases, it was the bribery schemes that evolved to bypass new standards. In other cases – particularly involving drug trafficking and the smuggling of human beings – it was the criminal strategies that transformed, including advanced concealment methods or new smuggling routes.
The study also offers a nuanced perspective on the relationship between corruption and criminal activites at border checkpoints: stronger capacity to counter criminal activities could lead to an increase in the risk of corruption, while a more coherent anti corruption framework could trigger criminal activities to evolve. Ultimately, the article argues that anti-crime and anti-corruption policies must account for this evolutionary nature.
Working Paper 58: Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam
When You Have Corrupt Friends Abroad: The Impact of Strategic Corruption on Sudan’s Democratic Collapse
A new peer-reviewed journal article looks into how corruption undermines democracies, with a specific focus on a context of weak governance.
Abstract
Much attention on strategic corruption has focused on how corruption can be weaponised to undermine democracy. This article takes a different angle, namely to understand this phenomenon from the perspective of the country that is the “target” of strategic corruption in a context of weak governance. The focus is on Sudan, where, in 2019, the civilian-military government led by Prime Minister Hamdok began an ambitious transition to democratic governance and adopting anti-corruption reforms, but this transition ended in 2023 with state collapse and conflict.
Using desk research and media analysis, the article explains the key points of contention among key actors and how external actors, through strategic corruption, became part of this story, ultimately helping to perpetuate the negative downward cycle.
Critically, rather than framing countries in the Global South as passive victims of strategic corruption, the analysis shows that political actors are active antagonists and, in their efforts to resist reform, build alliances with external actors who can help them achieve their goals. What is exchanged is access to valuable resources, which fuels corruption and undermines governance.
Quick Guide 38: Border corruption
Border corruption – defined simply as an illegal exchange between border officials and private actors – is a complex phenomenon with serious impacts on safety, health and security. And stopping it isn’t as easy as just stepping up enforcement.
This Quick Guide covers the what, who and why of border corruption. It is based on deep research for the EU-funded FALCON project. More such research is needed to help design effective strategies to prevent corruption from undermining border security.
About this Quick Guide
You are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 37: Strategic corruption
This quick guide is the second in a two-part series on the tangible yet under-addressed impacts of corruption on security and the complex power dynamics at play.
This second guide goes deeper into a specific security threat: when states use corruption to gain power and influence over other states and even as a geopolitical tool.
It looks at common features characterising strategic corruption cases, explores what is strategic about it and what this means for governance and security. It highlights the usefulness of “strategic corruption” as an analytical concept, but also urges caution in using it to guide domestic security or foreign policy decisions, or approaches to countering corruption.
About this Quick Guide
You are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Quick Guide 36: Corruption and security
How does corruption threaten national and international security, both directly and indirectly? Can viewing it through the lens of power offer deeper insights? And what might we achieve by framing corruption as a security concern?
This quick guide gives a short introduction to this complex issue as part of a two-part series on corruption, security and strategic corruption.
About this Quick Guide
You are free to share and republish this work under a Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 Licence. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Working Paper 52: Navigating the political context: Practice insights and adaptive strategies to strengthen the anti-corruption and asset recovery justice chain
Quick Guide 23: Informal networks and anti-corruption
Why do many countries still struggle with high levels of corruption, in spite of years of investment in anti-corruption programmes and even where the right laws, rules and institutions are in place?
We believe one reason is that anti-corruption laws and policies are too often focused narrowly on individuals, rather than networks of individuals.
In our research, we see repeatedly how high levels of corruption are rarely the result of individual behaviour – some isolated rotten apples transgressing the formal legal order and leading others astray. Rather, corruption more frequently springs from the social norms and group dynamics of well-articulated and resilient informal networks.
And it’s those networks that have much to lose from integrity and ethics. Their behaviour as a group entrenches corruption, and they block attempts at reforms. This quick guide takes a look at what this means and the implications for anti-corruption programming.
About this Quick Guide
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. It is part of the Basel Institute on Governance Quick Guide series, ISSN 2673-5229.
Research Case Study 5: Harnessing behavioural approaches against corruption
Social norms and behaviour change (SNBC) approaches are a promising complement to conventional anti-corruption strategies. Adopting a context-sensitive and nuanced approach is an essential ingredient for success.
We wanted to understand if and how behavioural approaches can promote anti-corruption outcomes, as well as conditions for success.
To do this we reviewed research from 2016–2022 on the use of behavioural approaches in anti-corruption practice. We also analysed our practical experience designing and piloting an intervention to tackle social norms of reciprocity which fuel bribery in health facilities in Tanzania.
Translating political economy insights into conservation practice: a six-step guide
This guide suggests six steps for bringing political economy analysis findings into a theory of change for a project or programme.
It aims to provide a practical means for conservationists to navigate political economy in contexts where they work. While a theory of change explains the logic of a project, a political economy analysis, which looks at the influence of power, helps get to the heart of what needs to change for a project to work. But practitioners often find it challenging to use political economy analysis in practice.
The aim of conservation is to safeguard people and nature. Theories of change articulate what needs to change to deliver on that aim, along with the kinds of things that need to happen to get to that change – what needs to be different.
Understanding more about who has power – to make change, to impede change – and how they get and use that power helps to clarify the conditions that need to change in order to achieve results.
About the TNRC project
The TNRC project seeks to improve biodiversity conservation outcomes by helping practitioners to address the threats posed by corruption to wildlife, fisheries and forests. TNRC harnesses existing knowledge, generates new evidence, and supports innovative policy and practice for more effective anti-corruption programming on the ground.
A USAID-funded project, TNRC is implemented by a consortium of leading organisations in anti-corruption, natural resource management, and conservation: World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre at the Chr. Michelsen Institute, TRAFFIC, and the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) at George Mason University.
This publication is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID, the United States Government, or individual TNRC consortium members.
News and blog
How corruption helps drug traffickers adapt to strengthened border enforcement
Corruption at border points remains a pressing global issue, threatening not only border integrity but also the health, safety and security of our societies. It enables illicit trafficking, facilitates organised crime and undermines trust in public institutions. In our Working Paper 58 , Saba Kassa and Jacopo Costa examine how corruption facilitates drug trafficking through the port of Rotterdam. Through in-depth interviews with stakeholders, a review of judicial cases and desk research, the paper shows how trafficking and corruption strategies are changing in response to strengthened enforcement at border spaces. It contributes to the growing body of work that looks at corruption from a systemic viewpoint, analysing the relationships and adaptive capabilities that allow organised crime to thrive. The Working Paper was written as part of the FALCON Fight Against Large-scale Corruption and Organised Crime Networks project. The research supports efforts to develop more robust and forward-looking approaches to combat corruption and drug trafficking. Read the executive summary below. Unintended consequences of strengthened enforcement This Working Paper examines how corruption facilitates drug trafficking specifically cocaine through the port of Rotterdam, looking at the underlying drivers and strategies involved. Legal trade routes and commercial ports are especially attractive because of the high volumes of cargo, which make it possible to conceal illicit cargo under licit cargo. The spatial complexity of the port of Rotterdam also makes it difficult to fully secure it against criminal activity. Digging deeper into the facilitating factors of trafficking, the paper finds that, paradoxically, a main driver of rising border corruption is the increased political attention on and resources dedicated to fighting trafficking. Desk research and stakeholder interviews highlight that as authorities deploy new technology to improve detection, traffickers face more obstacles to operating effectively. Having someone on the inside then becomes increasingly important. So, an unintended but important consequence of the strengthened fight against drug trafficking is that corruption becomes even more essential for the operational success of organised crime networks. Customs officials are specifically vulnerable This study focuses specifically on the role of customs. Tasked with monitoring the import and export of goods, customs officers are important actors in the fight against drug trafficking. However, their role also makes them vulnerable: they have crucial knowledge on processes and procedures, access to systems and discretionary power that can be exploited by criminals. The desk research shows that corruption is used strategically to circumvent two important bottlenecks: the container screening and security as cargo enters the port, and the exit of drugs from the port. Traffickers may seek to obtain key information or direct assistance from customs officers. Collusion – coercion – infiltration These corrupt relationships and the emerging networks between members of crime groups and the customs officials are diverse. Some relationships can be characterised by collusion, where customs officials offer their services or are persuaded to cooperate. This collusion may be opportunistic or targeted. Other relationships can be characterised by coercion. Customs officials may be lured by financial reward, but this is accompanied by intimidation or the threat of violence to ensure that the officer cooperates and continues to cooperate. Our research highlights that the boundary between collusion and coercion is often blurred. Beyond collusion and coercion, we also see infiltration, which crosses the boundaries between the criminal, public and private. What emerges is less a matter of individual corruption and more akin to regulatory capture, where the public office position is held by a member of the criminal network. The review of the judicial cases shows that bribes involved in these schemes can amount to millions. To hide and use the illicit gains, traffickers rely on money laundering, disguising its source as legitimate. They often enlist the help of family and friends, a trusted inner circle or professional specialists. They may also hide cash at home or invest it in assets and businesses in the Netherlands or abroad. Adaptive corruption strategies A key finding of our research is that the criminal and corruption strategies used to facilitate drug trafficking are highly adaptive. The underlying driver of this adaptability is the unchanging demand for drugs and high profitability of the crime. This pushes traffickers to adopt new strategies to overcome hurdles in supplying the demand. Corruption strategies adapt in response to new enforcement measures. When control systems are changed and/or strengthened, corruption strategies evolve alongside them. This research identifies some key patterns: Stronger detection efforts increase the incentives for corruption. Evolving systems encourage a similar shift in corruption strategies. Anti-corruption and anti-trafficking measures may change the profile of those most vulnerable to being co-opted. The characteristics of corruption can also evolve, from collusion to coercion, to full infiltration of institutions and systems – with blurred lines in between. Trafficking strategies evolve, too Trafficking strategies are similarly adaptive. There have been increased efforts by the port to combat trafficking through enhanced detection and technology. This was initially reflected by increased drug seizures. But since 2024, drugs seizures have declined. The research findings provide an explanation for this: As detection strengthens, more drug seizures are made. But what may happen, too, is a response to these new measures. As the risk of detection increases, criminals may adapt their trafficking strategies to overcome the additional hurdles, including: changing concealment strategies; and changing modes of transport and trafficking routes, including to ports outside of the Netherlands. Red flags and risk indicators These developments highlight the complexity in understanding the impact of stronger anti-trafficking measures on both corruption and trafficking strategies. Trafficking and corruption are typically measured by detection, for example, by changes in the volume of drug seizures or the number of public officials caught engaging in corruption. But the elephant in the room is that increasingly sophisticated criminal strategies can hide what is really happening. This underscores the need to continuously strengthen our ability to recognise “red flags” of corruption and trafficking. Data-driven tools and refined risk indicators are critical for understanding how crime and corruption strategies are changing. A holistic understanding and improved foresight The evolving nature of criminal strategies is often likened to a game of chess: enforcement makes a move, and criminal networks adapt. But what now seems to be emerging is more troubling. When barriers to drug trafficking increase while demand remains unchanged, crime and corruption strategies adapt in ways that can deepen their impact on society, leading for example to the hardening of crime and associated violence. This makes anticipating how crime may adapt to changing anti-corruption and anti-trafficking strategies critical. Improved foresight and scenario-building capacities will be vital in order to develop more robust enforcement efforts against drug trafficking and mitigate the negative impact on society. A holistic approach is essential. Addressing corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking requires a broad view of crime that focuses on understanding vulnerabilities, leveraging data and harnessing collaboration. The risk of trafficking routes changing are high, therefore, we must use every tool at our disposal to ensure effective and sustainable enforcement efforts. Learn more Download the full Working Paper 58: Corruption as a facilitator of drug trafficking in the port of Rotterdam: Drivers, strategies and implications View related online workshop for enforcement and research communities: Red flags at the frontier: detecting and disrupting border corruption in the EU , 23 September 2025 Acknowledgement and disclaimer FALCON is funded under the European Union’s Horizon Europe Framework Program Grant Agreement ID 101121281. The Basel Institute on Governance, as an associated partner without the right to receive funds directly from the European Research Executive Agency, has received funding from the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation SERI . The contents of the Working Paper are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the European Research Executive Agency or SERI.
Strategic corruption, democracy and security in Sudan
Amid geopolitical turbulence and concerns around the rise of authoritarianism and armed conflict, many people are looking at how corruption can be used “strategically” to deliberately undermine democratic institutions. The so-called strategic use of corruption is not new. It’s often portrayed simplistically as a kind of Western movie with good guys vs. bad guys, victims vs. aggressors. The picture is, of course, more complicated than that. In a recent article for the Public Integrity journal, we explore this phenomenon from the perspective of a country where strategic corruption was arguably linked to the collapse of a fledging democracy: Sudan. In 2019, the civilian-military government of Sudan led by Prime Minister Hamdok began an ambitious transition to democratic governance and the adoption of anti-corruption reforms. This transition ended in 2023 with state collapse and conflict. The story is a lesson on the complexity of corruption and on how closely anti-corruption efforts, democratic processes and security are linked. Growth of foreign-supported power centres The article tells the story of the governance system that emerged during the military-political rule of former President al-Bashir. At the time, there were powerful groups within the military, and coups were a frequent occurrence. A savvy solution was needed to address this. In order to appease these powerful military actors, including the Sudanese Armed Forces SAF and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces RSF , al-Bashir’s regime provided opportunities for them to expand their economic and business interests while politically keeping them under his direct control. Leveraging the country's rich natural resources became a means of maintaining political and economic power. Geopolitical significance Sudan’s geopolitical position is a critical part of the story. The Red Sea is a key trading route. Russia and states in the Gulf region developed engagements with these powerful military actors. They exchanged money and other support for access to Sudan's natural resources and strategic geographic locations. Corruption practices involved preferential investments and concessions in specific economic sectors such as mining and agriculture. There is also evidence of illicit financial flows associated with the gold trade, as well as the provision of financial resources and arms to non-state military actors. These deals served the geopolitical and domestic interests of both sides. One example from the article is that in 2017, al-Bashir sought Russia’s support in response to increasing internal political and economic pressures, as well as external pressures exerted by the West. Moscow offered a partnership with Sudan, including political support, arms and military training by private military contractors, who were deployed to Sudan immediately. In exchange, Russia gained access to a strategic commercial corridor in the Red Sea and preferential gold mining contracts. Nevertheless, the situation remained turbulent domestically and culminated in the popular uprising of 2018–2019. Al-Bashir was ousted from office. A Transitional Military Council, which involved both the SAF and RSF, was formed to lead the country until the handover to a civilian-military-led government in August 2019. Democratic transition undermined With the civilian-military-led government at the helm of political power, a bold transition to democracy began, with positive signs of strengthening the fight against corruption emerging. However, the aforementioned networks were directly impacted by Sudan’s democratic model and its citizens' aspirations. The networks and their leaders did not simply disappear with al-Bashir's removal. Behind the scenes, they were carefully orchestrating their next moves. Despite the reforms, during the transition period these military-business networks expanded even further. They leveraged the support of external actors and developed their economic investments with the twin goal of undermining reforms and maintaining dominance over the national economy. These actors became active antagonists of the democratic and anti-corruption reform process. After the course of reform went into reverse, armed conflict erupted once again in April 2023. A deeper understanding of corruption and democracy What happened in Sudan highlights this link between geopolitical objectives, corruption and the impact on democracy. It also challenges narratives that see strategic corruption simply as a tool wielded by foreign actors to undermine democracies. Instead, we must deepen our understanding of how domestic environments can create the conditions for strategic corruption. In Sudan, the revolution and the planned transition to democracy posed a threat to the individuals and networks benefiting from the status quo. This triggered them to use corruption and the help of external actors to undermine the process. Promoting anti-corruption work = promoting security The case of Sudan, like that of other countries undergoing democratic transitions, highlights the importance of supporting reforms that seek to strengthen democracy and counter corruption. Otherwise, the reform process risks being derailed, with horrific consequences for populations as well as instability in the wider region. The paradox of our time is that, amid current geopolitical shifts, development assistance and support for anti-corruption reform are under pressure while security and defence are prioritised. What happened in Sudan shows that this logic is a fallacy. Systemic corruption drives insecurity and instability. We cannot achieve security without fighting corruption and vice versa. This trend is even more concerning as the fragmentation of the rules-based international order creates an environment conducive to strategic forms of corruption. Learn more View the article in the Public Integrity journal: Karar, H., & Kassa, S. 2025 . When You Have Corrupt Friends Abroad: The Impact of Strategic Corruption on Sudan’s Democratic Collapse. Public Integrity, 1–14. See the Basel Institute’s Quick Guide to Strategic Corruption.
How informal power networks can instrumentalise anti-corruption institutions
In many countries with high levels of corruption, there is also a strong demand for government to do something about it. With the right conditions, that can fuel solid political commitments. We’ve seen, however, that even in cases where governments do all the right things on paper – strengthen legal frameworks, establish dedicated anti-corruption agencies, etc. – there's a gap between what they promise and what happens in practice. In a chapter for the forthcoming Routledge Handbook of Anti-Corruption Research and Practice , we go deeper into exploring one reason for this gap, namely the political instrumentalisation of efforts to prevent and curb corruption. We explain why and how it happens and provide examples from countries across the globe. This article presents the key findings. Why? Informal governance and corruption If you want to understand why and how anti-corruption institutions and laws can be used and abused to achieve strategic goals, you have to understand how informal networks of elites function and how this relates to corruption. High levels of corruption are often associated with informal governance practices. Informal governance is established through powerful networks that connect political elites, business interests and ordinary citizens. These informal networks can have different objectives. They help: political elites win and stay in power; business interests to access profitable benefits such as government contracts; and citizens cope and gain access to public services where governance is weak and resources are scarce. When informal networks rule, decisions, including on allocating public resources, are made for personal gain. Resources are redistributed informally for the benefit of insiders and at the expense of those outside these networks. Power is used to protect and ensure impunity for the loyal. Informal governance practices become entrenched and persist independently of individual network members. The result is a vicious cycle of informal governance and corruption that undermines the effectiveness of formal institutions. Informal governance practices are particularly evident in contexts characterised by state capture, defined as “a type of systematic corruption whereby narrow interest groups take control of the institutions and processes through which public policy is made, directing public policy away from the public interest and instead shaping it to serve their own interests”. Instrumentalisation as a way out of the dilemma Political power networks that face pressure to do something to curb corruption find themselves in a dilemma. They need to respond to demands for anti-corruption, but corruption is functional to the network's very survival. To prevent negative consequences and sanctions for the informal political power network itself, those pulling the strings need to ensure that anti-corruption institutions and their efforts are not too effective. They must be reined in, for example by instrumentalising anti-corruption endeavours. Here, political instrumentalisation means that dedicated anti-corruption agencies, or other public institutions charged with preventing and combating corruption or ensuring transparency and accountability, are informally repurposed to benefit those within the network. The result is that formal governance is weakened and the basic principles of the rule of law erode. The purpose can be two-fold not mutually exclusive : To undermine the anti-corruption institution's formal powers and weaken its impact on the power network. To shape the institution’s operations in a way that favours and strengthens the power network. Three strategies: co-optation, control and camouflage Based on research on informal governance and corruption combined with insights on mechanisms of state capture, we can identify three general strategies informal power networks use to shape anti-corruption institutions or undermine their formal powers: Co-optation : aligning institutional incentives with that of the power network This can be achieved by appointing allies and building informal loyalties both between the anti-corruption institution and the power network, and with other stakeholders in the law enforcement system i.e. the prosecution or judiciary. Control : weakening the influence of the institution in relation to the power network This is possible by limiting the resources or mandate of the anti-corruption institution, and by limiting the space for anti-corruption accountability stakeholders such as the media and civil society. Power networks shape the institution’s operations in a manner favourable to maintaining the network through: Camouflage : formal rules create the façade of commitment to anti-corruption... but they work to protect the network, because: they do not apply to corrupt network insiders impunity ; they are selectively applied to corrupt outsiders or to discipline network dissenters weaponisation or “rule by law” . Overarching insights and reflections Hard to “see” Given that political instrumentalisation of anti-corruption is enacted through formal structures and processes, it can be hard to observe. It can also look different on the surface. Control can happen through restrictions that weaken institutions. But it can also work through the provision of more resources, for example to institutions that have been co-opted to protect network insiders. A web of formal and informal rules Anti-corruption actions can be ambivalent when formal rules are selectively applied to camouflage corrupt informal practices. Formal and informal interests and rules are at play simultaneously, with different narratives being offered to insiders and outsiders. A successful corruption prosecution can give the appearance of a commitment to fighting corruption while in reality serving to target individuals outside the power network. Rule of law or rule by law? With high levels of informality, it’s difficult to tell if anti-corruption outcomes reflect genuine efforts to enforce the law equally and predictably rule of law , or if they indicate a strategic use of formal rules for the benefit of the informal network rule by law . Does a low number of high-profile corruption cases mean that control of corruption is strong, that investigation and prosecution capacities are weak, or that someone is being protected? Any bright sides? The book chapter concludes by providing practical entry points on what can be done, even in challenging contexts, to strengthen anti-corruption efforts. Three entry points are worth exploring: Let’s keep in mind: Power networks are fluid and can change. When their incentives align with the anti-corruption objectives of promoting integrity and curbing corruption, informal governance practices can also have a positive impact. It’s important to look for changes in the power structure to seize windows of opportunity. Ambivalence in institutional decision-making can be reduced by pushing for transparent, standard operating procedures for anti-corruption institutions. Even if formal political commitments to anti-corruption seem more rhetorical than genuine, they can still provide a useful anchor to promote and drive efforts for real change. Research shows that when governments fail to deliver on their commitments, they come under pressure to explain why change has not happened. This keeps anti-corruption high on the political agenda and in societal discourse. A starting point is to gain a thorough understanding of the broader political and governance context. In this regard, we have developed a framework for assessing and monitoring contextual factors that impact the performance of anti-corruption institutions. It allows us to better interpret anti-corruption actions, identify emerging positive or negative trends and respond more effectively to risks and opportunities. Learn more Saba Kassa’s chapter “Insights on the Political Instrumentalisation of Anti-Corruption Institutions: In Between a Rock and a Hard Place?” will be published in The Routledge Handbook of Anti-Corruption Research and Practice , available for pre-order on the publisher’s website. Kassa, Saba. 2024. “Navigating the political context: Practice insights and adaptive strategies to strengthen the anti-corruption and asset recovery justice chain”, Working Paper 52, Basel Institute on Governance. Baez-Camargo, Claudia and Alena Ledeneva. 2017. “Where Does Informality Stop and Corruption Begin? Informal Governance and the Public/Private Crossover in Mexico, Russia and Tanzania.” Slavonic and East European Review 95, no. 1: 49-75. Baez-Camargo, Claudia and Lucy Koechlin. 2018. “Informal Governance: Comparative Perspectives on Co-optation, Control and Camouflage in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.” International Development Policy Journal , 78-100. Basel Institute on Governance. 2023. “Informal Governance.” Dávid-Barrett, Elizabeth. 2023. “State capture and development: a conceptual framework.” Journal of International Relations and Development 26, 224-244.
New Working Paper and framework for navigating the political context of anti-corruption and asset recovery
Politics matters for the success of anti-corruption and asset recovery efforts. That is the starting point of our latest Working Paper, based on a two-year research project that combined the expertise and hands-on experience of our Prevention, Research and Innovation PRI team and our International Centre for Asset Recovery ICAR . The report discusses the political and governance factors that affect the performance of the justice system in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery. It also provides guidance on assessing these factors systematically – including through a novel Assessment and Monitoring Framework – with the goal of developing adaptive strategies to strengthen the justice chain in line with changing contexts. It draws on the experience and insights of ICAR staff working with anti-corruption institutions across the globe. It fills an important gap by enabling the systematic assessment and monitoring of contextual factors that impact the effectiveness of justice systems in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery. A few takeaways below: Thinking politically The evidence shows that there is a more conducive environment for strong performance of the justice system in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery when there is: strong political independence of the justice chain; strong governance within and between the anti-corruption institutions that constitute the chain; strong accountability of the respective anti-corruption institutions. There are 12 key political and governance factors in these three dimensions that shape the effectiveness of the justice chain. In this ecosystem, the justice chain sits at the centre, shaped top-down by governance factors related to political independence and bottom-up by governance factors related to accountability. You can click on the graphic below to expand it: Assessing and regularly monitoring changes in these factors makes it possible to identify opportunities and entry points for strengthening approaches to anti-corruption and asset recovery. It also works to explain where and why barriers to change and risks may arise. More complex than one might think Applying the framework demonstrates that what sounds straightforward at first glance – namely that an enabling environment will influence the justice chain’s performance positively – is actually much more complex. A seemingly conducive environment for improving the performance of anti-corruption institutions often comes with challenges and resistance: Opponents of reform fight back hard and often dirty. Solid anti-corruption and asset recovery results take time, which may fuel disappointment and discontent, hence civic expectations need to be managed. And as the fight against corruption intensifies and anti-corruption institutions start making progress, things are often perceived as getting worse. The flipside of this paradox is that even in an unfavourable context, when political and governance factors appear weak, opportunities to strengthen rule of law performance in relation to anti-corruption and asset recovery can still be found. Thinking politically allows us to make sense of this puzzle and navigate complex political contexts better. It highlights the importance of understanding how complex political and governance contexts shape the success of anti-corruption and asset recovery reforms. Working politically Changes in the political space for successful anti-corruption reform often follow a cyclical pattern, with windows of opportunity for deep reform opening and closing as the balance of power between pro- and anti-reform forces shifts. Understanding this cycle helps to identify how efforts to promote more robust performance of the justice chain can be better aligned, and made more responsive and proactive. Working politically highlights opportunities to prepare for, promote and deepen windows of opportunity to influence anti-corruption reforms. It is also helpful for thinking strategically about adapting approaches to prevent and slow regression and using anti-corruption principles to prevent abuse. Key approaches for adapting in an agile manner to contexts where spaces for successful anti-corruption reforms will vary include: cultivating trust with partners and stakeholders; promoting the rule of law as a collective endeavour; fostering institutionalisation through policies, systems and partnerships; celebrating and communicating success; and leveraging international and domestic partnerships to strengthen efforts. The lessons learnt from the frontline of practice emphasise that success in fighting corruption and recovering assets does not require having the perfect environment, institutions or people in place. Rather, adopting flexible engagement approaches tailored to specific contexts has proven effective. A tool for thinking and working politically The Assessment and Monitoring Framework at the heart of this paper is an evidence-based and practical tool that guides anti-corruption and asset recovery practitioners on how to tailor and localise their efforts in line with the political economy of each specific context. It comprises the 12 identified factors and provides an indicator for each. Additionally, indicative topics help to assess these indicators. The framework allows for an in-depth analysis and facilitates the development of baseline and update assessments in support of adaptive programming decisions. Applying the Assessment and Monitoring Framework is helpful in a variety of ways – to: comprehend the wider political and governance situation; understand the implications of changes in the political context; monitor red flags that could indicate political instrumentalisation; and identify and design responses to opening or closing windows of opportunity. Overall, it supports interventions that adapt to shifts in the political environment to achieve results. Learn more Download Working Paper 52: Navigating the political context: Practice insights and adaptive strategies to strengthen the anti-corruption and asset recovery justice chain, by Dr. Saba Kassa
How (strategic) corruption fuels insecurity by affecting power
How do corruption and security intersect? What is strategic corruption and what can we do about it? These were two fundamental questions tackled at the Countering Strategic Corruption workshop at the 2024 Basel Peace Forum. Claudia Baez Camargo, Head of Prevention, Research and Innovation at the Basel Institute on Governance, spoke at the event. Together with her colleague Saba Kassa, the team’s Deputy Head, she highlights two key ideas: Using the lens of power helps us to better understand how corruption impacts security . Corruption changes power dynamics, which in turn affect security. We need to see how corruption is a highly functional tool for those seeking not just private benefits but – in the case of strategic corruption – geopolitical goals. Power: at the heart of corruption and security issues Corruption fuels insecurity in many ways, directly and indirectly. But the big picture is that corruption affects the exercise of power by undermining it, or by strengthening it in a particular person or group’s favour. Changes in power in turn affect all forms of human security, including a country’s ability to defend itself against internal or external threats. It is useful to think of three different types of corruption: Corruption State power Implications Insecurity Endemic corruption Weakens ability to serve citizens. Erodes trust. Increases inequalities and poverty. Fuels insecurity. Erodes performance of security institutions. State capture Repressive capacities are instrumentalised. State institutions serve elites. Consolidates power in hands of political elites. Impunity is the norm. Enables discretionary and abusive control of security apparatus. Fuels radicalisation of oppressed groups. Strategic corruption State powers abused and weaponised to achieve a geopolitical goal. Funds conflict, weapons. Influences or destabilises other countries. Contributes to polarisation. Emboldens populists, authoritarian or violent groups. Endemic corruption: weakening institutions and trust Widespread and systemic corruption affects the ability of the state to serve citizens. Consider the theft of public funds earmarked for hospitals or medicines, which affects citizens' access to good health care. Consequences include higher inequality and poverty, as well as an erosion of trust in government and public institutions. This is where security risks come in. Popular protests may spur violence and conflict as tensions rise. In conflict-afflicted and fragile contexts, theft of humanitarian aid or resources dedicated to strengthening legitimate state actors and institutions can undermine the prospects for sustainable peace. A related problem is the systematic erosion of defence and security institutions. Corrupt procurement deals and embezzlement leave institutions with underpaid and underequipped staff while draining national budgets. This makes it very challenging to respond to domestic and external threats, and organised crime and terrorism can get a stronger foot in the door. For example, research in Nigeria has shown that corruption in the military affects the ability to respond effectively to the militant group Boko Haram. In other words, corruption undermines the most basic responsibility of states: protecting citizens from violence and conflict. State capture: centralising power State capture is a systemic form of corruption in which political elites, often together with economic elites, control state institutions for their narrow purposes. It is more than about siphoning off state resources with impunity. It can be about getting laws, such as procurement rules, just right for those political elites and their associates to win lucrative contracts or control valuable natural resource sectors. The unchecked ability to shape laws and direct state intuitions puts a lot of power in the hands of a few people. For example, they can instrumentalise enforcement institutions such as the police or courts to neutralise opponents and ensure impunity for their circle. All this strengthens their power base. And it shows again that corruption can be a highly functional tool. The citizens of a country suffering from state capture understand that power is exercised discretionarily and that the rules apply to some and not to others. Fear and powerlessness often close the door to challenging the situation through democratic means. Strategic corruption: a powerful geopolitical tool Strategic corruption goes beyond the kind of narrow personal benefits implied in the common definition of corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. Here, corruption is weaponised to help change power dynamics on the geopolitical stage. In this cross-border and global context, states can use corrupt means and divert public resources to fund their geopolitical objectives. For an in-depth case study of strategic corruption, see the Kremlin Playbook series. Looking at examples of strategic corruption again highlights the functionality of corruption. It’s used not only to gain money and control of resources but because it gives people the power to achieve their goals. That functionality goes both ways. Even in democratic contexts, politicians can use accusations of corruption to erode trust in opponents or public institutions and weaken their legitimacy. On the other hand, politicians with a strong anti-corruption platform can see success in the polls, as Guatemala and Bulgaria have recently demonstrated. What we can learn from corruption’s power and functionality The main takeaway? Looking at power and functionality helps us better understand how corruption affects security and at why strategic corruption is increasingly becoming a concern. The main lesson? That we need to fight strategic corruption by disrupting its functionality, i.e. making it less of an effective strategy for obtaining power and achieving other illicit goals. And to do that, we need to ensure that anti-corruption efforts are strategic, coordinated and effective.
How to make better use of political economy analysis in anti-corruption and conservation programming
It is becoming a truism that projects designed to address society’s biggest problems – like corruption or environmental degradation – need to be based on an understanding of the political context. It is clear why. Without an understanding of the political context, we may miss important policy opportunities or stakeholders who can support and sustain the project goals. Our efforts may clash with power dynamics in unexpected ways, introducing unforeseen risks and undermining what we seek to achieve. Taking the political context into account in a project’s theory of change enables us to learn about potential obstacles and adapt our plan accordingly. An insight into the local power dynamics and politics can also strengthen and validate the underlying logic of a project. So why don’t we use political economy insights in anti-corruption or conservation projects more often and more effectively? Six-step guidance Together with Micol Martini of WWF, I recently published a guide that offers practical suggestions for integrating political economy analysis results into a theory of change. She summarises the findings brilliantly in this IUCN blog, so I won’t repeat them here. Instead, at the guide’s online launch event, I first highlighted two common barriers to using political economy analyses in practice and ways to mitigate them. Myth 1: Political economy analyses are complicated to produce First, political economy analyses are often perceived as complicated to produce, requiring sophisticated political science skills. That isn’t true. Political economy analyses come in all shapes and sizes. Our guidance emphasises that pragmatic approaches can be useful in identifying the right political economy analysis approach. Political economy analyses are less about having the right skills and more about asking the right questions . Myth 2: Political economy analyses are problematic to use Second, political economy analyses are sometimes perceived as complicated to use. This is reinforced by the idea that politics and power are negative, presenting a danger to programmes. In fact, it is helpful to see how politics offers possibilities, not only problems. Understanding the politics and the context helps us to see new connections, find the right stakeholders to engage and spot the low-hanging fruit. Political priorities also shift, so it's good to keep abreast of how changes might impact a new or ongoing programme. What’s needed? At the launch event I also emphasised the need for spaces for dialogue between those conducting political economy analyses and programme implementers. Because political economy analysis is not only about thinking politically, it is about working politically. For example, as part of a collaboration with the Targeting Natural Resource Corruption TNRC project, we conducted political economy analyses in three countries to understand why corruption risks may arise in the investigation and prosecution of illegal wildlife trade cases. We had two different types of analysis. One looked at what kind of corruption risks may emerge in investigations and prosecutions of illegal wildlife trade cases. The other study explored the broader context and identified the underlying drivers of the corruption risks. Instead of just sending the results to stakeholders, we organised conversations where we presented the findings of the political economy analysis, summarised the key ideas and reflected on the implications for anti-corruption policies. In this way, we helped our colleagues and partners to design anti-corruption interventions that would: be more effective in their particular context; be more resilient to threats from powerful political interests and stakeholders; address the causes rather than only the symptoms; identify better ways to monitor and evaluate progress; be easier to adapt to changes in the political context. Learn more Read the six-step guide for practitioners: Translating political economy insights into conservation practice, by Micol Martini and Saba Kassa. Read our TNRC practice note: How political economy analysis can support corruption risk assessments to strengthen law enforcement against wildlife crimes. Watch the launch event and read the key takeaways.
New policy brief on how to reduce the social acceptability of wildlife trafficking
Behaviour change interventions aimed at reducing the social acceptability of wildlife trafficking are an important part of efforts to prevent wildlife crime. But how can practitioners craft messages that will be effective in changing attitudes and behaviours? Our latest policy brief aims to support policymakers and practitioners seeking to improve conservation outcomes through behaviour change interventions. Based on field work and community engagement in Uganda, it summarises lessons learned about how to develop and frame effective messages in the context of counter-wildlife trafficking interventions. The research was funded by PMI Impact as part of a wider project on stopping corruption from fuelling illegal wildlife trade between East Africa and Southeast Asia. Audience, content, framing The findings reveal that a key first step is to narrowly identify the right target audience. While a general public awareness campaign may have its merits, it may be more effective to focus on those identified as most vulnerable to participating in wildlife trafficking, namely young men, those that live around wildlife trafficking hotspots and those involved in trade. Second, it appears most promising to formulate messages that challenge narrow utilitarian perceptions of wildlife by highlighting the hidden costs of trafficking and its negative impact on the economy and the environment. Messages that focus on legal risks should showcase successes in detection and sanctions, especially in a context in which impunity is perceived to be high. Other messages that seek to challenge the overvalued benefits of engaging in wildlife trafficking in relation to wealth and social status should be carefully nuanced to avoid rejection. Third, how we frame such messages is equally important. The research suggests that appealing to social identity and highlighting personal consequences are the most promising frames to adopt. Overall, practitioners are advised to develop and test messages and approaches that are personal and precise. Learn more Read Policy Brief 7: Reducing the social acceptability of wildlife trafficking through behaviour change interventions. Find out more about the work of our Public Governance team on corruption, social norms and behaviours. Learn about our Green Corruption programme, which applies anti-corruption approaches to address the causes of environmental degradation.
Policy recommendations: combating wildlife trafficking in Uganda
Turning wildlife trafficking into a high-risk, low-profit trade is challenging. Our recent research on why and how wildlife trafficking happens in Uganda gives some insights into the factors that sustain the supply of large volumes of wildlife products moving from wildlife habitats in Africa to the hands of consumers all over the world. The research shows that structural drivers of weak governance systems and constrained socio-economic contexts provide the macro-level conditions for illegal activities, such as wildlife trafficking, to flourish in Uganda. Attempting to curtail wildlife trafficking should therefore also consider, account and address the underlying structural foundations of high levels of poverty and corruption that provide a conducive environment for illicit activities and economies. Considerations for wildlife trade prevention in Uganda Practitioners working on developing approaches to fight wildlife trafficking and the associated corruption should consider the following: Islands of effectiveness: Although the Ugandan governance context certainly presents significant challenges, it also provides examples of how it is possible for “islands of effectiveness” to emerge. This term refers to institutions which, despite being embedded in challenging contexts, manage to implement reforms and mechanisms that allow for meaningful improvement in institutional performance and control of corruption outcomes. From this perspective, promoting stronger performance in preventing wildlife trafficking would require attention to working with and incentivising anti-corruption and wildlife “champions” and leaders. It also means closely aligning approaches with national priorities such as the economy, social welfare, corruption and financial crime, natural resource management, environment and peace and security. Alternative economic opportunities: The development of sustainable schemes to generate alternative economic opportunities for vulnerable groups will be needed to make it less attractive for individuals to support wildlife trafficking. Experiences of reformed poachers confirm that providing alternative livelihood sources or income-generating activities associated with wildlife habitats is an effective deterrent to becoming involved in wildlife trafficking. Addressing stereotypes: Tackling adverse mental models involves utilising behavioural insights to develop effective information or edutainment campaigns that challenge conventional wisdoms. Public awareness campaigns could disseminate stories and illustrative examples that challenge prevailing beliefs about wildlife and make it less socially acceptable to support wildlife trafficking. The messages could potentially be reinforced through positive role models and could also be tailored to expose the hidden costs of wildlife trafficking and corruption that hurt communities and individuals. Holistic approaches that tackle both the supply and demand for wildlife products are important. Equally important is to put the spotlight not only on poachers but on the organised criminal networks above them and equally the consumers of wildlife products at the end stage of this illicit market. As part of a holistic approach, it is crucial to not only focus on punishment but also prevention. Programmes should consider the drivers, facilitators and functionality of participating in wildlife trafficking. Moreover, it is essential that high levels of political support and strong regional collaborative law enforcement measures converge with conservation efforts at the grassroots level. This should translate into tangible improvements in the lives and livelihoods of those living near wildlife habitats. All of this would contribute to Uganda becoming the path of most resistance for wildlife trafficking. Six key lessons for practitioners Understanding and addressing context-sensitive drivers of wildlife trafficking can complement traditional approaches to curbing the trade. Incorporating insights from behavioural theory about how to challenge prevailing stereotypes and bring to light hidden costs associated with the illegal wildlife trade can provide more grassroots legitimisation for the fight against it. Wildlife trafficking does not operate in a vacuum. It therefore can only be addressed holistically, considering the larger macro-level conditions of weak governance that provides the background for all sorts of illegal activities to flourish. Wildlife trafficking networks operate via informal structures of social connections between poachers, middlemen and buyers across vast geographical spaces. The networks are organised yet fluid and dynamic at the same time. Shedding more insights into the invisible social infrastructure that sustains the illicit trade can provide key insights into ways in which to disrupt these networks. Corruption too often is seen as a tactic – a financial exchange that facilitates the evasion of the law enforcement system. But corruption involves relationships too, social bonds through which public officials are co-opted into the social infrastructure of the network. Insights into the role of public officials in the trafficking networks are crucial to understanding the ways in which rules and regulations are undermined. “Lack of political will” is a catch-all phrase to explain why laws are in place but systematically undermined. Understanding the particular behaviours that facilitate wildlife trafficking and the incentives that give rise to them can shed light on institutional junctions and processes where corruption risks are highest and which explain why an implementation gap is persistent. This more precise understanding of the problem should be the starting point to develop better interventions. Learn more Download the full policy brief here. Read Working Paper 33: A worm’s-eye view of wildlife trafficking in Uganda – the path of least resistance. Find out more about our Public Governance team and their current research projects. Learn more about the Basel Institute's Green Corruption programme, including our two-year PMI Impact-funded project to prevent corruption from fuelling illegal wildlife trade along the East Africa - South East Asia route. We are grateful to PMI Impact for funding this valuable research.
How organised crime networks and corruption facilitate illegal wildlife trade in Uganda
Our recent policy brief on Curbing wildlife trafficking in Uganda: lessons for practitioners summarises the main findings from extensive field research on the drivers, facilitators and strategies of wildlife trafficking in Uganda. The first question took a behavioural lens to the question of why Uganda has become a hub for wildlife trafficking in East Africa. The second question looks at how wildlife trafficking happens in Uganda. The research evidence suggests that coordination, concealment and corruption are the three basic ingredients of the trafficking networks’ modus operandi in Uganda. A top-down, orchestrated supply chain Poverty and weak rule of law generate incentives for diverse groups of people to respond to the demand for wildlife products. And while the supply of wildlife products can be established opportunistically from the bottom up, this is not the predominant characterisation of how large volumes of products are sourced in the region. Rather, the findings suggest that wildlife products are procured, handled and transported through a top-down, orchestrated and organised supply chain. Four key functional roles sustain this supply chain in Uganda and the region, connecting poachers and local middlemen around wildlife habitats to urban middlemen and buyers in the larger towns and cities. While at its higher echelons there is a need to develop long-term relationships of trust, as one moves to the grassroots the trafficking networks can rely on a large supply of willing accomplices to support their operations. The number of network members, their relative roles, the nature of the collaboration, the relative distance between them and their physical bases can all differ. The research suggests that this fluid shape and dynamic structure of the network forms the backbone of a strategic infrastructure of cooperation that facilitates wildlife trafficking. Border crossings – who helps, who turns a blind eye? Hidden in backpacks, back seats of cars, inside fuel trucks and military trucks or whatever other creative strategy is employed, wildlife products can enter Uganda both through official and unofficial border crossings. The wildlife products find their way from border towns to Kampala where they are consolidated, concealed and cleared for export in preparation for long-haul transport. The research suggests that products most frequently are trafficked out of Uganda via road towards the port of Mombasa in Kenya or via air out of Entebbe Airport. At the same time, the attractiveness of particular routes is not static but changes and adapts to the conditions on the ground. Along the chain, the trafficking networks are frequently aided by private sector agents, from customs clearing agents and freight forwarders, who help cover up their illicit transport activities, to individuals working at banks and other financial institutions, who work to keep their ill-gained profits from being detected. While concealment is necessary, it is not sufficient to manage the trafficking of high volumes of wildlife products out of Uganda. It is here where corrupt relationships with public officials come in. One-off bribes vs long-term relationships Such relationships are varied and multifaceted, as the research suggests. For instance, corruption can be a one-off problem-solving strategy, for example to secure the release of a trafficker who has been caught red-handed. However, public officials are not only bribed when the network hits a snag in their operation. In other cases, they may be proactively and strategically co-opted to prevent the law enforcement chain from being activated in the first place. The research evidence suggests that this selective co-optation of useful and strategic individuals into the trafficking network – alongside elaborate concealment techniques – facilitates the trafficking of large volumes of wildlife products into, through and out of Uganda. The research evidence is not strong enough to establish how widespread such bribery practices are. However, indications that trafficking networks strategically target and co-opt key public officials through bribes shed light on some of the factors undermining the effectiveness of important enforcement measures in place to fight wildlife trafficking. Trafficking networks therefore capitalise on a governance context with high levels of corruption that offers opportunities for illegal activities to flourish. As the image in this post illustrates, the law enforcement system offers many entry points to opportunistically corrupt public officials and thereby cripple its operation along the trafficking route. Systematic corruption to evade law enforcement at every step Corruption therefore undermines a crucial first step to fighting wildlife trafficking, namely, the detection of wildlife animal trafficking. According to the research findings, the reasons why those with monitoring powers might turn a blind eye are varied. They might have been bribed to do so but they might also decide not to seize illicit or suspect shipments if they believe that a powerful figure is involved. Such elements can impact the entire law enforcement chain, from border police, wildlife authority staff, customs officials and prosecutors to judges. Furthermore, without detection, there is no investigation, arrest, prosecution or sanctioning. In sum, the strategic use of corruption to evade the law enforcement framework and facilitate the trafficking of high volumes of wildlife products make Uganda, in the words of many research participants, the “path of least resistance”. Learn more Download the full policy brief here. Read Working Paper 33: A worm’s-eye view of wildlife trafficking in Uganda – the path of least resistance. Find out more about our Public Governance team and their current research projects. Learn more about the Basel Institute's Green Corruption programme, including our two-year PMI Impact-funded project to prevent corruption from fuelling illegal wildlife trade along the East Africa - South East Asia route. We are grateful to PMI Impact for funding this valuable research.
Wildlife trafficking in Uganda: poverty, governance and perceptions
Our recent policy brief on Curbing wildlife trafficking in Uganda: lessons for practitioners summarises the main findings from extensive field research on the drivers, facilitators and strategies of wildlife trafficking in Uganda. Applying a behavioural lens, the first research question looks at why Uganda has become a hub for wildlife trafficking in East Africa. Our field research covered 47 interviews and six focus group discussions with reformed poachers and members of communities located near wildlife habitats. Here are the findings to that first question. For the full details and academic references, please see the PDF. So why does wildlife trafficking happen in Uganda? The research evidence suggests there are three key drivers and facilitators: 1\. Wildlife trafficking is a way to meet economic needs The wildlife trafficking supply chain starts in and around rural areas near natural habitats from where wildlife goods are transported to larger towns. These areas are often afflicted by high levels of poverty and unmet needs, which means that money-making opportunities are not easily passed up, even if they are illicit. This is most vividly illustrated when focus group participants discuss an offer that the fictional “Daniel” receives to help in the transport of wildlife products: Daniel has a job as a daily labourer. He is a father and together with his wife, he raises his 5- and 2-year-old daughters. One day Daniel is approached by an old acquaintance named Peter. Peter asks him if he would be interested in helping his business. Peter moves wildlife goods, such as ivory and horn, from one city to another in Uganda. Peter could really use Daniel’s help with different tasks, such as: packaging the wildlife goods in different boxes; stacking and organising these boxes in a local warehouse; and loading these boxes onto trucks ready for transport to other cities. The prospect of earning a substantial higher income than he has now has him interested. But he is not sure. Research participants note that most individuals irrespective of gender who might find themselves in the position of “Daniel” would surely take the offer. Because livelihood opportunities are constrained, accepting a lucrative business deal that can support both “Daniel” and his family is viewed as an appropriate decision. Adding to this, the evidence from the research suggests that social pressures compound the incentives against rejecting such an offer, even if it is known that the activities are illegal and there might be a risk of getting caught, because doing so would be considered foolish in the eyes of family and friends. 2\. Wildlife trafficking is facilitated by weak governance Uganda has a comprehensive framework in place to prevent and curb wildlife trafficking, including a new Wildlife Act in 2019. Additionally, a specialised Standards, Wildlife and Utilities Court has been set up to deal with cases of wildlife crime a first in the continent and a large intergovernmental committee has been tasked to co-ordinate anti-poaching activities and curb wildlife trafficking across the country. But laws, regulations and taskforces have limited impact when there is a sizeable implementation gap, as is the case in many sectors and agencies in Uganda. In turn, high levels of informality characterise many public sector institutions in Uganda, including some of those tasked with enforcing sanctions for inappropriate behaviour of public officials. Informality refers to the presence of powerful yet unofficial systems of governance within the public sphere. Indeed, the prevalence of informal ways of operating through unwritten norms, understandings and even accountability relationships is associated with high levels of corruption in many countries, including Uganda. This provides the background to understand why trafficking networks are able to instrumentally co-opt individuals in positions of public authority, building and nourishing informal relationships with officials who can help turn a blind eye to certain shipments, or who might help with the release of a detained trafficker. 3\. Stereotypes about wildlife trafficking People often make sense of their environment and justify their decisions based on commonly held narratives, views, or stereotypes also known as mental models. For example, mental models provide shortcuts to judge whether an action is pertinent and acceptable under certain circumstances. Mental models also shape the expectations about behaviours associated with certain roles e.g. “all politicians are corrupt . Stereotypes and casual narratives are always at play and at a very basic level help with making decisions, i.e. to accept or decline a lucrative yet illegal offer to support trafficking and the justifications for it. Therefore, understanding and framing the meanings ascribed to wildlife and wildlife trafficking within their broader context is important. In this regard, it is noteworthy that many anti-poaching and trafficking campaigns often invoke the notion that it is important to care for wild animals. But the research evidence suggests that this association is perhaps too distant from the way in which wild animals and trafficking are viewed by those on the ground. Rather, the research suggests that wildlife is frequently characterised as not ecologically valuable. Frequent stereotypes involve wildlife being seen as commodities to be used, as resources that are owned by the state and therefore belong to nobody , or competing with humans over already stressed natural and public resources. Wildlife trafficking also lacks the negative connotation that those unfamiliar with the context may automatically assume it to have. Wildlife products are viewed very positively, as valuable, rare and as symbols of status and power. Trafficking, in turn, is viewed as a benign form of informal trade that is legitimate, whether legal or not, and a source of wealth and status. The perspectives of focus group participants regarding the fictitious business man “Peter” who offers “Daniel” a business opportunity by transporting wildlife products are indicative. He was not characterised as a criminal but as a wealthy and generous individual who provides opportunities for the needy. Utilitarian perspectives of wildlife, alongside characterisations of wildlife trafficking as a benign, legitimate form of informal trade that brings wealth and status, fuels the social acceptability of wildlife trafficking. Such sentiments can provide the justification needed to accept opportunities to support illegal activities. These range from citizens who transport products across the border to public officials who look away for a small fee. Takeaway In brief, the research shows that individuals engaging in the initial stages of wildlife trafficking chain are driven predominantly by aspirations of wealth to overcome socio-economic hardships. This is reinforced by a context in which informal relationships prevail over formal governance structures and by stereotypes that depict trading in wildlife products as benign and legitimate. Learn more Download the full policy brief here. Read Working Paper 33: A worm’s-eye view of wildlife trafficking in Uganda – the path of least resistance. Find out more about our Public Governance team and their current research projects. Learn more about the Basel Institute's Green Corruption programme, including our two-year PMI Impact-funded project to prevent corruption from fuelling illegal wildlife trade along the East Africa - South East Asia route. We are grateful to PMI Impact for funding this valuable research.
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